Kokią knygą dabar skaitai?

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Ar skaitote knygas?

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Total votes: 128
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Vilius
emeritas
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Joined: 2004-04-19 12:28

2020-08-23 11:30

Neseniai bendravau su vienu pažįstamu estu, tai jis sakė, kad skaito "Pietinia kronikas" (Rimantas Kmita) verstą į vokiečių kalbą. Klausė, kaip man ta knyga patiko.. Tai, sakykim, turėjau nelabai malonų atsiminimų trippą į mokyklos laikus, kai lietuvių kalbos mokytoja vis įkyriai uždavinėdavo labai panašius klausimus apie kitas neskaitytas knygas :)

Tai dabar jau garantuotai reikės pirkti tą knygą pirmai progai pasitaikius - nes jei jau verčia į kitas kalbas, tai matyt nebus visai netikusi. Be to, visai įdomu pažiūrėti kaip tie gūdūs 90-ieji atrodė kitiems amžininkams.
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Vilius
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2020-08-23 11:33

O aš pats dabar baiginėju skaityti bene hipsteriškiausią knygą ever. "Trise valtimi. Neskaitant šuns".. Bet išleista 1934-ais metais Budapešte.. Esperanto kalba. Pajuskit ironiško pretenzingumo jėgą, varguoliai 8)
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Stormas
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2020-08-25 22:35

Vilius wrote:
2020-08-23 11:33
O aš pats dabar baiginėju skaityti bene hipsteriškiausią knygą ever. "Trise valtimi. Neskaitant šuns".. Bet išleista 1934-ais metais Budapešte.. Esperanto kalba. Pajuskit ironiško pretenzingumo jėgą, varguoliai 8)
o tai Esperanto kalba ir skaitai? Ji iš vis dar egzistuoja? Nes kiek pamenu tai tik sci-fi knygose ji egzistuodavo :D
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Vilius
emeritas
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2020-08-25 23:07

Stormas wrote:
2020-08-25 22:35
o tai Esperanto kalba ir skaitai?
Jep.
Stormas wrote:
2020-08-25 22:35
Ji iš vis dar egzistuoja? Nes kiek pamenu tai tik sci-fi knygose ji egzistuodavo :D
Gal su kokia Klingon kalba maišai?.. Esperanto visada buvo reali kalba, kuria bendrauja tikri žmonės. Gal ne tiek daug žmonių, kaip kažkada svajojo pradininkai.. Bet keli šimtai tūkstančių entuziastų turbūt atsirastų visame pasaulyje.

Aš pats galiu skaityti ir rašyti saikingai naudodamas žodyną.. Su kalbėjimu sunkiau, nes retai tenka, bet manau galėčiau palaikyti paprastą pokalbį bendromis temomis.
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Seianus
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2020-08-25 23:30

Vilius wrote:
2020-08-25 23:07
Gal su kokia Klingon kalba maišai?.. Esperanto visada buvo reali kalba, kuria bendrauja tikri žmonės.
Klingonų kinda irgi. Keliasdešimt Star Trek entuziastų turbūt iš bėdos kažką pakalbėtų. Girdėjau vienas net vaiką nuo mažens mėgino išmokyti lygiagrečiai su anglų kalba, bet net mažiukas būdamas vaikas jau suprato, kad tėvas dibilizmais užsiiminėja ir labiau kalbėjo angliškai.

Įdomu, kiek žmonių kalba elfiškai ir kitomis Tolkieno sukurtomis kalbomis. Spėju gerokai daugiau, nei klingoniškai. Esperanto skaičių vis gi turbūt nesiektų..
Bet keli šimtai tūkstančių entuziastų turbūt atsirastų visame pasaulyje.
Na... Žmonės mėgsta perdėti savo kalbos gebėjimus ir/arba nesugeba suvokti, kaip prastai kažkokią kalbą moka. Tarkime Lietuvoje beveik visas jaunimas sako, kad moka angliškai, kai realiai gali tą kalbą maždaug suprasti ir iš bėdos maždaug kažką pasakyti kad suprastų angliakalbiai, ir jei pasitaikys mandagūs, tai susivaldytų ir nežvengtų. Ir čia anglų, kalba, su kuria beveik visi susiduriame kasdien. Tai entuziastų keli šimtai k gal ir atsirastų, bet kaip manai, koks būtų jų esperanto lygis. Pradedančiojo? :)
RB
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2021-01-12 16:43

Švenčių proga eilinį kartą suskaičiau Joe Abercrombie „First Law“ trilogiją ir tęsinius. Vis dar manau, kad tai vienas geriausių fantasy žanro kūrinių šalia G. R. R. Martin'o „A Song of Ice and Fire“ su tuo neginčytinu privalumu, kad jis yra užbaigtas. Įdomūs ir įtikinantys personažai, smagus rašymo stilius (pamenu, pirmą kartą skaitant jis man vietomis kliuvo, bet dabar niekaip nebesuprantu, kuo), negailestingas trope'ų laužymas.
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Stormas
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2021-01-14 22:03

RB wrote:
2021-01-12 16:43
Švenčių proga eilinį kartą suskaičiau Joe Abercrombie „First Law“ trilogiją ir tęsinius. Vis dar manau, kad tai vienas geriausių fantasy žanro kūrinių šalia G. R. R. Martin'o „A Song of Ice and Fire“ su tuo neginčytinu privalumu, kad jis yra užbaigtas. Įdomūs ir įtikinantys personažai, smagus rašymo stilius (pamenu, pirmą kartą skaitant jis man vietomis kliuvo, bet dabar niekaip nebesuprantu, kuo), negailestingas trope'ų laužymas.
Ačiū už rekomendaciją, kai pabaigsiu hyperioną tai griebsiu šitą, bet su mano dabartiniais tempais tai čia gali ir metų prireikt :D
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Svetimas
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2021-04-17 18:38

viewtopic.php?p=111153#p111153
Svetimas wrote:
2021-03-25 12:26
Aš pats kažkada sugundytas vienos Alasdair MacIntyre knygos paminėjimo V.Laučiaus straipsnyje pagalvojau, kad galbūt visai vertėtų bent iš smalsumo pasidomėti jo darbais. Pvz.: After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Bet taip ir neatėjo įkvėpimas tam.

V. Laučiaus minėtos "Whose Justice? Which Rationality?" knygos elektroninio varianto nemačiau ant greitųjų, kad būtų kur buvęs.
Kažkaip po naujesnių šnekų visgi susigundžiau šiek tiek iš smalsumo patyrinėti minėtą Alasdair MacIntyre After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory knygą.

Pažiūrinėjau nemokamą knygos demo-ištrauką. Autoriaus rašymo stilius man iš pirmo žvilgsnio pasirodė vandeningas, bet užtikau mane sudominusius pasamprotavimus apie daugeliui labai dažnai matytą ir pažįstamą nesusikalbėjimą šiuolaikinėse vertybinėse diskusijose ir to problematiką. Pvz. (spoileryje pateikta gan smarkiai netrumpa knygos ištrauka):
The Nature of Moral Disagreement Today and the Claims of Emotivism
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The most striking feature of contemporary moral utterance is that so much of it is used to express disagreements; and the most striking feature of the debates in which these disagreements are expressed is their interminable character. I do not mean by this just that such debates go on and on and on—although they do—but also that they apparently can find no terminus. There seems to be no rational way of securing moral agreement in our culture. Consider three examples of just such contemporary moral debate framed in terms of characteristic and well-known rival moral arguments:

1.
(a) A just war is one in which the good to be achieved outweighs the evils involved in waging the war and in which a clear distinction can be made between combatants—whose lives are at stake—and innocent noncombatants. But in a modern war calculation of future escalation is never reliable and no practically applicable distinction between combatants and noncombatants can be made. Therefore no modern war can be a just war and we all now ought to be pacifists.

(b) If you wish for peace, prepare for war. The only way to achieve peace is to deter potential aggressors. Therefore you must build up your armaments and make it clear that going to war on any particular scale is not necessarily ruled out by your policies. An inescapable part of making this clear is being prepared both to fight limited wars and to go not only to, but beyond, the nuclear brink on certain types of occasion. Otherwise you will not avoid war and you will be defeated.

(c) Wars between the Great Powers are purely destructive; but wars waged to liberate oppressed groups, especially in the Third World, are a necessary and therefore justified means for destroying the exploitative domination which stands between mankind and happiness.

2.
(a) Everybody has certain rights over his or her own person, including his or her own body. It follows from the nature of these rights that at the stage when the embryo is essentially part of the mother’s body, the mother has a right to make her own uncoerced decision on whether she will have an abortion or not. Therefore abortion is morally permissible and ought to be allowed by law.

(b) I cannot will that my mother should have had an abortion when she was pregnant with me, except perhaps if it had been certain that the embryo was dead or gravely damaged. But if I cannot will this in my own case, how can I consistently deny to others the right to life that I claim for myself? I would break the so-called Golden Rule unless I denied that a mother has in general a right to an abortion. I am not of course thereby committed to the view that abortion ought to be legally prohibited.

(c) Murder is wrong. Murder is the taking of innocent life. An embryo is an identifiable individual, differing from a newborn infant only in being at an earlier stage on the long road to adult capacities and, if any life is innocent, that of an embryo is. If infanticide is murder, as it is, abortion is murder. So abortion is not only morally wrong, but ought to be legally prohibited.

3.
(a) Justice demands that every citizen should enjoy, so far as is possible, an equal opportunity to develop his or her talents and his or her other potentialities. But prerequisites for the provision of such equal opportunity include the provision of equal access to health care and to education. Therefore justice requires the governmental provision of health and educational services, financed out of taxation, and it also requires that no citizen should be able to buy an unfair share of such services. This in turn requires the abolition of private schools and private medical practice.

(b) Everybody has a right to incur such and only such obligations as he or she wishes, to be free to make such and only such contracts as he or she desires and to determine his or her own free choices. Physicians must therefore be free to practice on such terms as they desire and patients must be free to choose among physicians; teachers must be free to teach on such terms as they choose and pupils and parents to go where they wish for education. Freedom thus requires not only the existence of private practice in medicine and private schools in education, but also the abolition of those restraints on private practice which are imposed by licensing and regulation by such bodies as universities, medical schools, the A.M.A. and the state.



These arguments have only to be stated to be recognized as being widely influential in our society. They have of course their articulate expert spokesmen: Herman Kahn and the Pope, Che Guevara and Milton Friedman are among the authors who have produced variant versions of them. But it is their appearance in newspaper editorials and high-school debates, on radio talk shows and letters to congressmen, in bars, barracks and boardrooms, it is their typicality that makes them important examples here. What salient characteristics do these debates and disagreements share?

They are of three kinds. The first is what I shall call, adapting an expression from the philosophy of science, the conceptual incommensurability of the rival arguments in each of the three debates. Every one of the arguments is logically valid or can be easily expanded so as to be made so; the conclusions
do indeed follow from the premises. But the rival premises are such that we possess no rational way of weighing the claims of one as against another. For each premise employs some quite different normative or evaluative concept from the others, so that the claims made upon us are of quite different kinds.

In the first argument, for example, premises which invoke justice and innocence are at odds with premises which invoke success and survival; in the second, premises which invoke rights are at odds with those which invoke universalizability; in the third it is the claim of equality that is matched against that of liberty. It is precisely because there is in our society no established way of deciding between these claims that moral argument appears to be necessarily interminable. From our rival conclusions we can argue back to our rival premises; but when we do arrive at our premises argument ceases and the invocation of one premise against another becomes a matter of pure assertion and counter-assertion. Hence perhaps the slightly shrill tone of so much moral debate.

But that shrillness may have an additional source. For it is not only in arguments with others that we are reduced so quickly to assertion and counter-assertion; it is also in the arguments that we have within ourselves. For whenever an agent enters the forum of public debate he has already presumably, explicitly or implicitly, settled the matter in question in his own mind. Yet if we possess no unassailable criteria, no set of compelling reasons by means of which we may convince our opponents, it follows that in the process of making up our own minds we can have made no appeal to such criteria or such reasons. If I lack any good reasons to invoke against you, it must seem that I lack any good reasons. Hence it seems that underlying my own position there must be some non-rational decision to adopt that position. Corresponding to the interminability of public argument there is at least the appearance of a disquieting private arbitrariness. It is small wonder if we become defensive and therefore shrill.

A second, equally important, but contrasting, characteristic of these arguments is that they do none the less purport to be impersonal rational arguments and as such are usually presented in a mode appropriate to that impersonality. What is that mode? Consider two different ways in which I may provide backing for an injunction to someone else to perform some specific action. In the first type of case I say, ‘Do so-and-so’. The person addressed replies, ‘Why should I do so-and-so?’ I reply, ‘Because I wish it.’ Here I have given the person addressed no reason to do what I command or request unless he or she independently possesses some particular reason for paying regard to my wishes. If I am your superior officer—in the police, say, or the army—or otherwise have power or authority over you, or if you love me or fear me or want something from me, then by saying ‘Because I wish it’ I have indeed given you a reason, although not perhaps a sufficient reason, for doing what it is that I enjoin. Notice that in this type of case whether my utterance gives you a reason or not depends on certain characteristics possessed at the time of hearing or otherwise learning of the utterance by you. What reason-giving force the injunction has depends in this way on the personal context of the utterance.

Contrast with this the type of case in which the answer to the question ‘Why should I do so-and-so?’ (after someone has said ‘Do so-and-so’) is not ‘Because I wish it’, but some such utterance as ‘Because it would give pleasure to a number of people’ or ‘Because it is your duty’. In this type of case the reason given for action either is or is not a good reason for performing the action in question independently of who utters it or even of whether it is uttered at all. Moreover the appeal is to a type of consideration which is independent of the relationship between speaker and hearer. Its use presupposes the existence of impersonal criteria—the existence, independently of the preferences or attitudes of speaker and hearer, of standards of justice or generosity or duty. The particular link between the context of utterance and the force of the reason-giving which always holds in the case of expressions of personal preferences or desire is severed in the case of moral and other evaluative utterances.

This second characteristic of contemporary moral utterance and argument, when combined with the first, imparts a paradoxical air to contemporary moral disagreement. For if we attended solely to the first characteristic, to the way in which what at first appears to be argument relapses so quickly into unargued disagreement, we might conclude that there is nothing to such contemporary disagreements but a clash of antagonistic wills, each will determined by some set of arbitrary choices of its own. But this second characteristic, the use of expressions whose distinctive function in our language is to embody what purports to be an appeal to objective standards, suggests otherwise. For even if the surface appearance of argument is only a masquerade, the question remains ‘Why this masquerade?’

What is it about rational argument which is so important that it is the nearly universal appearance assumed by those who engage in moral conflict? Does not this suggest that the practice of moral argument in our culture expresses at least an aspiration to be or to become rational in this area of our lives?

A third salient characteristic of contemporary moral debate is intimately related to the first two. It is easy to see that the different conceptually incommensurable premises of the rival arguments deployed in these debates have a wide variety of historical origins. The concept of justice in the first argument has its roots in Aristotle’s account of the virtues; the second argument’s genealogy runs through Bismarck and Clausewitz to Machiavelli; the concept of liberation in the third argument has shallow roots in Marx, deeper roots in Fichte. In the second debate a concept of rights which has Lockean antecedents is matched against a view of universalizability which is recognizably Kantian and an appeal to the moral law which is Thomist. In the third debate an argument which owes debts to T.H. Green and to Rousseau competes with one which has Adam Smith as a grandfather. This catalogue of great names is suggestive; but it may be misleading in two ways. The citing of individual names may lead us to underestimate the complexity of the history and the ancestry of such arguments; and it may lead us to look for that history and that ancestry only in the writings of philosophers and theorists instead of in those intricate bodies of theory and practice which constitute human cultures, the beliefs of which are articulated by philosophers and theorists only in a partial and selective manner. But the catalogue of names does suggest how wide and heterogeneous the variety of moral sources is from which we have inherited. The surface rhetoric of our culture is apt to speak complacently of moral pluralism in this connection, but the notion of pluralism is too imprecise. For it may equally well apply to an ordered dialogue of intersecting viewpoints and to an unharmonious melange of ill-assorted fragments. The suspicion—and for the moment it can only be a suspicion—that it is the latter with which we have to deal is heightened when we recognize that all those various concepts which inform our moral discourse were originally at home in larger totalities of theory and practice in which they enjoyed a role and function supplied by contexts of which they have now been deprived. Moreover the concepts we employ have in at least some cases changed their character in the past three hundred years; the evaluative expressions we use have changed their meaning. In the transition from the variety of contexts in which they were originally at home to our own contemporary culture ‘virtue’ and ‘justice’ and ‘piety’ and ‘duty’ and even ‘ought’ have become other than they once were. How ought we to write the history of such changes?

It is in trying to answer this question that the connection between these features of contemporary moral debate and my initial hypothesis becomes clear. For if I am right in supposing that the language of morality passed from a state of order to a state of disorder, this passage will surely be reflected in—in part indeed will actually consist in—just such changes of meaning. Moreover, if the characteristics of our own moral arguments which I have identified—most notably the fact that we simultaneously and inconsistently treat moral argument as an exercise of our rational powers and as mere expressive assertion—are symptoms of moral disorder, we ought to be able to construct a true historical narrative in which at an earlier stage moral argument is very different in kind. Can we?

One obstacle to our so doing has been the persistently unhistorical treatment of moral philosophy by contemporary philosophers in both the writing about and the teaching of the subject. We all too often still treat the moral philosophers of the past as contributors to a single debate with a relatively unvarying subject-matter, treating Plato and Hume and Mill as contemporaries both of ourselves and of each other. This leads to an abstraction of these writers from the cultural and social milieus in which they lived and thought and so the history of their thought acquires a false independence from the rest of the culture. Kant ceases to be part of the history of Prussia, Hume is no longer a Scotsman. For from the standpoint of moral philosophy as we conceive it these characteristics have become irrelevances. Empirical history is one thing, philosophy quite another. But are we right in understanding the division between academic disciplines in the way that we conventionally do? Once again there seems to be a possible relationship between the history of moral discourse and the history of the academic curriculum.

Yet at this point it may rightly be retorted: You keep speaking of possibilities, of suspicions, of hypotheses. You allow that what you are suggesting will initially seem implausible. You are in this at least right. For all this resort to conjectures about history is unnecessary. The way in which you have stated the problem is misleading. Contemporary moral argument is rationally interminable, because all moral, indeed all evaluative, argument is and always must be rationally interminable. Contemporary moral disagreements of a certain kind cannot be resolved, because no moral disagreements of that kind in any age, past, present or future, can be resolved. What you present as a contingent feature of our culture, standing in need of some special, perhaps historical explanation, is a necessary feature of all cultures which possess evaluative discourse. This is a challenge which cannot be avoided at an early stage in this argument. Can it be defeated?

One philosophical theory which this challenge specifically invites us to confront is emotivism. Emotivism is the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character. Particular judgments may of course unite moral and factual elements. ‘Arson, being destructive of property, is wrong’ unites the factual judgment that arson destroys property with the moral judgment that arson is wrong. But the moral element in such a judgment is always to be sharply distinguished from the factual. Factual judgments are true or false; and in the realm of fact there are rational criteria by means of which we may secure agreement as to what is true and what is false. But moral judgments, being expressions of attitude or feeling, are neither true nor false; and agreement in moral judgment is not to be secured by any rational method, for there are none. It is to be secured, if at all, by producing certain non-rational effects on the emotions or attitudes of those who disagree with one. We use moral judgments not only to express our own feelings and attitudes, but also precisely to produce such effects in others.

Emotivism is thus a theory which professes to give an account of all value judgments whatsoever. Clearly if it is true, all moral disagreement is rationally interminable; and clearly if that is true then certain of the features of contemporary moral debate to which I drew attention earlier do indeed have nothing to do with what is specifically contemporary. But is it true?
[...]
Sudomino. Jeigu netyčia rasiu knygoj kokių sau įdomių idėjų ir nepamiršiu, pabandysiu pasidalinti.
RB
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2021-11-27 10:44

Ką tik baigiau Hannah Arendt The Origins of Totalitarianism.
Gan sunki ir painokai parašyta knyga, nemažai teiginių, su kuriais nesutinku ar išvadų, kurios atrodo kiek pritemptos, bet apskritai labai įdomus bandymas pažvelgti į totalitarizmo prigimtį ir totalitarinių režimų veikimą.

Kažkada labai didelį įspūdį paliko A. Koestler „Darkness at Noon“, kur totalitarizmo logika bandoma paaiškinti per grožinį kūrinį, bet net ir kelis kartus ją perskaičius išliko pojūtis, kad lyg ir supratau, ką norima pasakyti, bet nesugebu iki galo aiškiai pats sau to suformuluoti. Dabar Arendt užpildė šią spragą. Apskritai įdomu pastebėti, kaip jos mintys organiškai susiriša tiek su jau minėta Koestler'io knyga, tiek su Orwell'o „1984“.

Žodžiu, besidomintiems politine filosofija ir nebijantiems iššūkių labai rekomenduoju.
msilvija75
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2022-02-03 15:05

Bandau daugiau filosofinių knygų skaityt, tai tik dabar įpusėjau G. Orwell'o 'Apie tiesą' (perkuknyga.lt/zanras/filosofija). Verčia kvestionuoti moralumą ir visuomenės afišuojamą tiesą. Susimastyti vertas minčių ir įžvalgų rinkinys, ko manau autorius prikaupė nemažai per ilgą karjerą. Ateičiai jau žvalgausi naujų filosofijos perlų. Pasiūlykit kur geriausia būtų ieškoti ir parekomenduokit, ką lengvesnio žanro naujokei.
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Svetimas
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2022-02-03 21:27

msilvija75 wrote:
2022-02-03 15:05
Ateičiai jau žvalgausi naujų filosofijos perlų. Pasiūlykit kur geriausia būtų ieškoti ir parekomenduokit, ką lengvesnio žanro naujokei.
Ką nors iš lengvesnio žanro naujokei?

Pats nesu skaitęs, bet esu girdėjęs atsiliepimų, jog On Bullshit gana nebloga ir berods lygtais nėra sudėtinga, nors ir filosofo rašyta (jei kartais patiko G. Orwell'o pamąstymai apie tiesą, tai gal netyčia paliks kažkokį įspūdį ir kažkas iš šios srities). Yra ši knyga išversta ir į lietuvių kalbą ("Apie šūdmalą").

Dar yra gan keistoko Norvegų autoriaus "Sofijos pasaulis" knyga vaikams apie filosofijos istoriją. Nors knyga skirta vaikams, bet galbūt gali patikti ir ne vaikams, kam nepatinka filosofų daugžodžiavimai ar pernelyg sudėtingi, migloti ar painūs išvartymai ir kam smalsu susidaryti bent jau labai grubų paviršutinišką bendrą vaizdą apie filosofijos istoriją iš senesnių laikų ar jos raidą. Vėliau neriant ir kažkur giliau ir rimčiau, jei kažkurios idėjos netyčia konkrečiau sudomintų.
RB
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2022-02-06 23:16

Svetimas wrote:
2022-02-03 21:27
Dar yra gan keistoko Norvegų autoriaus "Sofijos pasaulis" knyga vaikams apie filosofijos istoriją. Nors knyga skirta vaikams, bet galbūt gali patikti ir ne vaikams
Mhm, man ji visai patiko, kai skaičiau jau ne visai vaikiško amžiaus būdamas.

Savo ruožtu, mėgstantiems istoriją galiu parekomenduoti Ian Mortimer knygas. Niekada nebuvau biografijų gerbėjas, bet The Greatest Traitor: The Life of Sir Roger Mortimer, Ruler of England: 1327--1330 ir The Fears of Henry IV: The Life of England's Self-Made King labai patiko. The Time Traveler's Guide to Medieval England: A Handbook for Visitors to the Fourteenth Century paliko kiek mažesnį įspūdį.
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Svetimas
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2022-02-08 08:27

RB wrote:
2022-02-06 23:16
Savo ruožtu, mėgstantiems istoriją galiu parekomenduoti Ian Mortimer knygas.
Dėkui, RB.
O kaip jums Mika Waltari knygos?
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Seianus
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2022-02-08 08:44

Svetimas wrote:
2022-02-08 08:27
O kaip jums Mika Waltari knygos?
Iš jaunystės pamenu, kad apskritai patiko, bet atrodė per daug ištęstos. Tiesa, aš ir skaičiau gal kokią vieną - apie Konstantinopolio užkariavimą, pamiršau net pavadinimą. Per paskutinius 20 metų skonis visgi stipriai pasikeitė, nežinau, kaip vertinčiau dabar.
O tu gal irgi goodreads esi užsiregistravęs?
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Svetimas
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Location: Vilnius

2022-02-10 21:05

Seianus wrote:
2022-02-08 08:44
Iš jaunystės pamenu, kad apskritai patiko, bet atrodė per daug ištęstos. Tiesa, aš ir skaičiau gal kokią vieną - apie Konstantinopolio užkariavimą, pamiršau net pavadinimą.
"Mirties angelas" greičiausiai buvo.
Man irgi, kiek pamenu, momentais šiek tiek sunkokai skaitėsi. Nors keli žmonės iš man artimos aplinkos smarkiai rekomendavo ir galbūt per daug užkėlė lūkesčius. Bet gal ir įkvėpimo tada didelio nebuvo ir kiti dalykai labiau galvoje rūpėjo.
Nors, kaip ir sakei, skonis su laiku nemažai keičiasi. Galbūt jei dabar kažką iš Mika Waltari bandyčiau skaityti, gal ir kiek kitoks įspūdis jau būtų.
Seianus wrote:
2022-02-08 08:44
O tu gal irgi goodreads esi užsiregistravęs?
Buvau užsiregistravęs kažkada senokai, bet praktiškai kaip ir niekad rimčiau savo reikmėms nesinaudojau. O kodėl klausi?
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Seianus
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Joined: 2018-11-16 23:57

2022-02-11 07:53

Svetimas wrote:
2022-02-10 21:05
"Mirties angelas" greičiausiai buvo.
Man irgi, kiek pamenu, momentais šiek tiek sunkokai skaitėsi. Nors keli žmonės iš man artimos aplinkos smarkiai rekomendavo ir galbūt per daug užkėlė lūkesčius. Bet gal ir įkvėpimo tada didelio nebuvo ir kiti dalykai labiau galvoje rūpėjo.
Nors, kaip ir sakei, skonis su laiku nemažai keičiasi. Galbūt jei dabar kažką iš Mika Waltari bandyčiau skaityti, gal ir kiek kitoks įspūdis jau būtų.
Man vis tiek lengviau, nei Sinuhė Egiptietis, kurio išvis neįveikiau :)
Buvau užsiregistravęs kažkada senokai, bet praktiškai kaip ir niekad rimčiau savo reikmėms nesinaudojau. O kodėl klausi?
Šiaip, ten patogi platforma pasižiūrėti, ką skaito ir kaip vertina pažįstami, bet aš irgi beveik nebesinaudoju. Aktyviausi naudotojai, bent tarp lietuvių, pradeda nešti vos ne į kažkokį knygų kultą, kur skaitymas tampa kažkokia savaimine vertybe, o tarp knygų kriterijų būna net ir viršelių spalva.
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